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MODERN AIR LAW PROBLEMS AND THE
"CUJUS SOLUM" MAXIM
Courts have lately been forced to re-examine the maxim, "Cuius est
solum ejus est usque ad coelum,"1 with a view of determining its effect
upon modem air-law problems. This maxim was first introduced into
English law during the reign of Lord Coke and was supported by
decisions in Baten's case 3 and Fay v. Prentice.4 Both of these cases
involved nuisances in which there was an objection to overhanging
structures which permitted rain to fall from the defendant's cornice or
some other part of his structure on the plaintiff's land.
In Pickeringv. Rudd a case involving the question of a board projecting or overhanging a neighbor's enclosure, Lord Ellenborough first
overruled the maxim. It is as though he had looked into the future and
foreseen the coming of the airplane and the problems it would bring,
for, in writing his opinion, he considered the rights of an aeronaut in
a hypothetical case used in his reasoning.0 In Lord Ellenborough's reasoning of almost 125 years ago it is interesting to note that his concept
of the "cujus solum" maxim is strictly in conformity with that of the
majority of courts which already have passed upon the maxim in
connection with air travel today. For example, in Gay v. Taylor where
aircraft from a field five hundred feet away flew at such low altitudes
over the plaintiff's land as to make it dangerous to use the property
in a reasonable way, it was held that although the maxim formerly did
and in fact may still be given force as a maxim, it cannot be applied in
cases of an alleged air trespass except where such trespasses are of
such a nature as to interfere with the reasonable and proper enjoyment
of the plaintiff's property. If the latter conditions were present, and
the courts granted relief such would be based upon the theory of
nuisance and not solely upon trespass.
IHe who owns the surface soil owns also up to the sky above it, and the
2

center of the earth beneath it.
Coke's death occurred in 1634.

3 9 Coke's Reports 54b, 77 Eng. Rep. 811 (1611).
4 1 C. B. 828, 135 Eng. Rep. 769 (1845).
r 4 Campbell 219, 171 Eng. Rep. 70 (1815).
6 "1 do not think it is a trespass to interfere with the column of air superincumbent on the close ...I am by no means prepared to say that firing across
a field in vacuo, no part of the contents touching it, amounts to a clausum
fregit. Nay, if this board overhanging the plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it
would follow that an aeronaut is liable to an action quare clasum fregit at
at the suit of the occupier of-every field over which his baloon passes in the
course of his voyage."
7
Gay v. Taylor, 1934 U.S. Av. Rep. 146 (1932), (Penn.-Not officially reported). An injunction was granted in this case upon the nuisance theory
which in this particular instance embodied elements of noise, dust, congregating crowds and apprehension of danger from low flying and stunting planes
which when considered together did interfere with the reasonable enjoyment
of plaintiff's property but the case was not decided on any arguments of
trespass.
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The latest decision upon this matter was Hinman v. Pacific Air
Transport Corporation,8 in which the court declared that the "cujus
solum" maxim, "is not the law and never was the law," but narrowed
the scope of the statement by adding the phrase, "in respect to aerial
navigation." In the Hinman case the defendant operated planes at less
than one-hundred feet and as low as five feet over the plaintiff's land
in disregard of notices to discontinue. The court held that no injunction could be granted on the ground of trespass under such facts. It
was stated that the ownership of space above land could not be measured by any device quite as effectively as by the use to which the landowner put such space. The decision in effect holds that a landowner
owns only as much of the airspace above his property as he uses and
he has an absolute right to this space only as long as he so continues
to use it. In discussing the maxim the court further stated: "When it
is said that man owns or may own to the heavens, that merely means
that no one can acquire a right to the space above him that will limit
him in whatever use he can make of it as a part of his enjoyment of
the land. To this extent his title to the air is paramount. No other
person can acquire any title or exclusive right to any space above
him." It is obvious from this statement, therefore, that no necessary
use to which a landowner could put his overhead space would interfere with or hinder aerial navigation.
In adjudicating the rights of a landowner below the soil it was held
that the "cujus solum" maxim would have no force in the decision
because the court decided that it was overshadowed by another maxim
which contends that "one must use his own so as not to injure
another."' ' The effect of this holding was to declare that a landowner
is not entitled to an unrestricted use of the water flowing under his
lands, if such a usage will injure his neighbor. This is the majority
rule and has been followed by all states except Wisconsin which continues to follow the common law and permits a landowner to exercise
an unfettered use of underground water.=
Air space rights have by virtue of their importance, found their
way into the leasing of railroad properties. In Phoenix Insurance Co.
v. New York & Harlem R. R. Co. 2 the question of leasing the air space
6

Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport Corp., 84 F. (2d) 755 (C.C.A. 9th 1936),
1936 U. S. Av. Rep. 1.

*Ibid.
10

Erickson v. Crookston Water Works, Power & Light Co., 100 Minn. 481, 111
N.W. 391 (1907).
n Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354, 62 L.R.A. 589 (1903). The Wisconsin supreme court held to the English and common law rules fashioned
after the "Cujus Solum" Maxim which effect is to give the landowner the
right to use such waters as he sees fit, even to the extent of malicious waste.
= Phoenix Ins. Co. of Hartford v. N. Y. & Harlem R. R. Co., 59 F. (2d) 962,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1932).

"

. ..

to the extent that super surface spaces were not
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over the railroad's property was raised by some of the stockholders.
The instant case shows that this mode of conveyance has advanced
beyond the experimental stage and is being used in several instances to
realize upon the valuable building space above tracks and yards in
downtown areas.13 Such properties are unique in having a description
4
containing three dimensions.1
Plane-owners seeking the right to fly over another's land attempted
to assert such right upon the theory of easement or prescription. These
attempts were unsuccessful and it has been held that it is impossible to
obtain an easement through the airspace above another's land by continuous use or by prescription.'3 Airplanes, even if trespassing repeatedly do not pass in the same place as to linear space or altitudes, and
thus no prescriptive right to any particular way of passage is obtained
Objections to flight by property owners over their property have
been based upon the theories of trespass and nuisance. Thus, flights at
one-hundred feet over the plaintiff's property have been declared to
constitute a trespass. 17 However, in the Hinman case 8 an unreasonable
flight was held to be a nuisance but not a trespass. And in Gay v. Taylor" the airport itself was declared to be a nuisance by reason of the
noise, dust and low flying planes.
In an attempt to satisfy both landowners and aviators the courts
have attempted to establish a minimum altitude to be maintained by
aviators. Only flights at lower altitudes were held to be a trespass.
However, it has been stated that no definite line of demarcation of
flight could be set, and it always remains a question of fact whether a
flight at five feet above another's land constitutes a trespass.20 Thus it
has been held that the reasonableness of the altitude depends upon the
at the time required for railroad purposes, leases thereof were made by the
Central for commercial purposes. Under these leass for twenty-one years the
super-surface spaces were safeguarded for future raiload uses should such
uses become necessary."
'3Bell, Air Rights (1928) 23 ILL. L. REv. 250, 261; Schmidt, Public Utility Air
Rights (1929) 54 A.B.A. REP. 839.
(1928) 23 ILL. L. REv. 250.
'15Supra note 8.
'-

Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 269 Mass. 639, 170 N.E. 385, 1930 U.S.
Av. Rep. 1 (1930).
'17Ibid note 16. In this case the court stated that flight at one hundred feet would
constitute trespass but seemed to infer that various higher flights would not
necessarily be trespasses. It might be well to mention that no injunction was
granted in this case because whether there was such trespass or not there
was no evidence of danger or injury to livestock or property of the plaintiff.
Also Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Dunlop, 266 N.Y. Supp. 469, 148 Misc.
849, 5 Jour. Air Law 655 (1934). Trespass was present as a matter of law
where defendant crashed into plaintiff's transmission line towers, reversing
lower court which held otherwise.
IsSupra note 8.
16

Supra note 7.
o Supra note 8.
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2
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character of the lands flown over.2 No injunction will be granted to
any landowner who complains of trespass unless real injury can be
shown. Thus where there was neither evidence of fright or apprehension of personal danger, nor injury to plaintiff's livestock or property,
22
an injunction was denied.
In 1926 the Air Commerce Act was passed. This act coupled with
the Uniform Aeronautics Act2 4 has tended to settle the question as to
who shall have the authority to fly or restrict flight over privately
owned lands. By the Air Commerce Act the United States assumed
sovereignty of all air space over all of its lands and waters for the
purpose of preventing any serious impeding of aviation by the rights
of those who may have varied and conflicting interests and also to
guard against a free flight by planes of foreign jurisdictions.
The Uniform Aeronautics Act was approved by the National Conference of the Commission on Uniform State Laws in 1922. Legislatures in adopting this act often have made some changes. Under the
act the states assume sovereignty in all the airspace over their respective jurisdictions which the Federal Government has not takenm In
2 Supra note 16.
2
2

Ibid.

49 U.S.C.A. § 176. "The Congress hereby declares that the Government of the
United States has, to the exclusion of all foreign nations, complete sovereignty of the air space over the lands and waters of the United States,
including the Canal Zone, except in accordance with an authorization granted
by the Secretary of State." The Air Commerce Act of 1926 was framed under
Article 1, Sec. 8, of the Federal Constitution, which provides that Congress
shall have the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations and among
the several states and with the Indian tribes."
24Arizona C6de, 1928, 1934 Supp., §§ 175Z22 to 175Z44 1929 U.S. Av. Rep.
403; Delaware Original Act 1928 U.S. Av. Rep. 472; Hawaii Rev. Laws
1935 Secs. 6975-6986 1928 U.S. Av. Rep. 472, 482; Idaho Code 1932, Secs 21101 to 21-110 1931 U.S. Av. Rep. 335; Indiana Burns' Stat. 1933, §§ 14-101 to
14-112 1928 U.S. Av. Rep. 472, 484; Md. Bagby's Code, 1929 Supp., Art 1-A
1928 U.S. Av. Rep. 472, 519; Mich. Comp. Laws 1929 §§ 4811-4821 1928 U.S.
Av. Rep. 472, 532; Minn. Mason's Stat., '31 Supp. §§ 5494-7 to 5494-21 1929
U.S. Av. Rep. 625; Mo. St. Ann., §§ 13905-13915 1929 U.S. Av. Rep. 648;
Mont. Original Act 1929 U.S. Av. Rep. 655; Nev. Comp. Laws 1929 §§ 275288 1928 U.S. Av. Rep. 472, 545; N. J. Comp. Stat., 1930 Supp., §§ 15-21 to
15-34 1929 U.S. Av. Rep. 683; N. Car. Code 1935, §§ 191(j)-191(w) 1929 U.S.
Av. Rep. 701; N. Dak. Supp '25, §§ 2971 cl 2971 cl 2 1928 U.S. Av. Rep. 472,
557; R.I. Original Act 1929 U.S. Av. Rep. 799; So. Car. Code 1932, §§ 71007111 1929 U.S. Av. Rep. 810; S. D. Comp. Laws 1929, §§ 8666-L to 8666-W
1928 U.S. Av. Rep. 472, 569; Tenn. Code 1932, §§ 2716 to 2726 1928 U.S. Av.
Rep. 472, 569; Utah Rev. Stat. 1933, §§ 4-0-1 to 4-0-9 1928 U.S. Av. Rep. 472,
571; Vermont Pub. Laws 1933, §§ 5219 to 5249 1928 U.S. Av. Rep. 472, 571;
Wis. Stat. 1933, §§ 114.01 to 114.10 1929 U.S. Av. Rep. 872.
25 "Section 2. Sovereignty in Space.-Sovereignty in the space above the lands
and waters of this state is declared to rest in the state, except where granted
to and assumed by the United States pursuant to a constitutional grant from
the people of this state. Section 3. Ownership of Space.-The ownership of
the space above the lands and waters of this state is declared to be vested in
the sevbral owners of the surface beneath, subject to th right of flight described in Section 4. Section 4. Lawfulness of Flight.-Flight in aircraft over
the lands and waters of this state is lawful, unless at such low altitudes as to
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adopting the act the Wiconsin Legislature made but minor changes.2
In conclusion, it may safely be predicted that the matter of air
space rights and aerial navigation will be the subject of much future
legislation. A statute recently enacted in New Jersey illustrates this
fact.2 7 This statute would appear to enable airports to buy airspace

in their immediate -vicnity and thereby reduce their liability, m and
would tend to diminish situations similar to that of Tucker v. United
Air Lnes, 9 where the landowner was granted an injunction against the
Air Transport Company from operating aircraft at a height of less
than thirty feet over the plaintiff's land and also enjoined the plaintiff
from erecting any poles or trees wlch might prove dangerous to craft
operating out of the airport.
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interfere with the then existing use to which the land or water, or the space
over the land or water is put by the owner or unless so conducted as to be
imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land or water
beneath. The landing of an aircraft on the lands or waters of another, without his consent, is unlawful, except in the case of a forced landing, etc."
2 114.02 Sky Sovereignty. Sovereignty in the space above the lands and waters
of this state is declared to rest in the state, except where granted to and
assumed by the United States. 114.03 Landowner's Rights Skyward. The ownership of space above the lands and waters of this state is declared to be
vested in the several owners of the surface beneath, subject to the right of
flight described in section 114.04. 114.04 Flying Lawful, Landing Unlawful,
Limitations; Emergency. Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this
state is lawful, unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to which the land or water, or the space over the land or water, is put
by the owner, or unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous or damaging to persons or property lawfully on the land or water beneath. The landing of an aircraft on the lands or waters of another, without his consent,
is unlawful, except in the case of a forced landing. For damages caused by a
forced landing, however, the owner or lessee of the aircraft or the aeronaut
shall be liable as provided in section 114.05.
27 New Jersey Laws of 1938, Chapter 370. "Estates, rights and interest in areas
above the surface of the ground, whether or not contiguous thereto, may be
validly created in persons or corporations other than the owner or owners
of the land below such areas and shall be deemed to be estates, rights and
interests in land."
28 (1938) 52 HARv. L REv. 355.
2 Tuckerv. United Air Lines & City of Iowa City, 1936 U.S. Av. Rep. 10 (1935).

